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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL W. BARNEY, ) 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL ] 
and PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, ] 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ] 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
PETITION FOR WRIT 
1 OF CERTIORARI 
1 Case No. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question is the finality of an order denying dismissal of 
an agency action brought into issue upon a motion to dismiss for 
violation of the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. 
REFERENCE TO THE OPINION OF 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARL W. BARNEY, Petitioner, vs. DIVISION OF OCCUPATION 
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE 
OF UTAH, Respondent. 
Case No. 910755-CA, Filed: March 26, 1992 
Citation: 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
DATE OF ENTRY OF DECISION: March 26, 1992. 
Provisions believed to confer jurisdiction to review the 
decision are: 78-2-3(2), 78-2-3(3)(a), 78-2-3(5), and 78-
2a-4, 1953 Utah Code Ann., as amended. 
1 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This case was an original proceeding in the Utah Court of 
Appeals seeking review of agency action denying dismissal of an 
agency action of the grounds that the action constituted double 
jeopardy under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and cases thereunder. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
This case began as an amended petition for agency action 
before the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
(OPL). 
The petition charged, among other things, assaults upon four 
psychiatric patients. These charges had been previously made under 
statute in the criminal courts of Weber County. 
One charge had resulted in a trial and a finding of not guilty 
by the Circuit Court. Other charges had been made in another 
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District Court and had been dismissed upon the motion of the State 
at the instigance of the OPL. 
An amended Notice of Agency Action was issued under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
A timely motion was brought to dismiss the agency action on 
the ground that the action constituted punishment and violated the 
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. 
The motion was denied, and timely review of that order was 
sought before the Department of Commerce. 
Review was denied, and a timely petition for review of both 
orders was filed in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DISPOSITION OF PETITION BELOW: 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Review of 
Agency Action of the ground that the agency action did not 
constitute a final order, and that the court did not have 
jurisdiction to review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Other than for two obvious misstatements of dates, the facts 
of the case are not in dispute. 
Petitioner is licensed by the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing to administer a health facility. The 
Division is empowered to suspend, revoke or place on probation the 
license of any licensee who is or has been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule. On May 2, 1991, the 
Division filed its initial petition alleging that the petitioner 
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engaged in unprofessional conduct including physically abusing four 
patients, administering contaminated medicines, and administering 
medication without a physician's order. On July 22, 1991, the 
Division filed an amended petition alleging basically the same 
conduct. 
On May 14, 1990, petitioner was found by the Second Circuit 
Court to be not guilty of assault of one of the four patients. On 
April 25, 1991, charges of "Abuse of Mentally 111 Persons" were 
dismissed. In two separate motions, petitioner moved to dismiss 
the Division's petitions on grounds that the proceeding constituted 
double jeopardy under the federal and state constitutions, and on 
a claim that the Division did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Ad administrative 
law judge denied the initial motion to dismiss on August 2, 1991, 
and denied the motion to dismiss the amended petition on 
October 30, 1991, the petitioner filed a Petition for Agency 
Review, requesting a review of the denial of the motion to dismiss. 
On December 18, 1991, the agency issued an order denying 
petitioner's request for agency review of the denial of the motion 
to dismiss. Petitioner filed the present petition for judicial 
review, requesting the Appellate Court to review the denial of his 
motions to dismiss and request for agency review. See Appendix, 
Opinion of court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
Regardless of the label attached in the proceeding by the 
State, civil, criminal or otherwise, under the double jeopardy 
4 
clause of the Federal Constitution, a defendant who has already 
been tried and acquitted in a criminal prosecution may not be 
subjected to additional trial and sanction to the extent that the 
second proceeding may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but 
only as a deterrent or retribution. See United States v. Halper, 
490 US 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 LEd 2d. 487 (1989) at 109 S. Ct. 
1901-02. 
The double jeopardy clause bars prosecution of the charges 
against the petitioner herein as much as the State has admitted in 
its charge that it will seek to prove the entirety of the conduct 
required to establish an essential element of the charge with proof 
of conduct constituting an offense for which the petitioner has 
already been prosecuted and acquitted in a court of law. 
Successive prosecutions following acquittals raise concerns 
that extend beyond the mere possibility of an enhanced penalty. 
They allow the State to make repeated attempts to punish an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and an ordeal compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. They also give the 
State an opportunity to rehearse its presentation of proof, thus 
increasing the risk of an erroneous finding of fact for one or more 
of the offenses charges. Gradv v. Corbin, 495 US 508; 110 S.Ct. 
2084; 109 LEd 2d. 548 (1990). 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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POINT I. 
FINALITY HAS BEEN DECIDED IN A WAY THAT IS 
IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P2d. 463, (Ut. App - 1989) and 
the Court of Appeals to the contrary, it is the very nature of a 
successful double jeopardy claim that there are no further 
proceedings to be had. 
Interpreting the Sloan case in the manner of further 
proceedings under the subject agency action, is in direct conflict 
with the prior cases of this court. 
State v. Ambrose, 598 P2d. 354, (Utah - 1979), in applying 
Federal law to the question of finality of double jeopardy orders 
holds that the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss is a 
"final" judgment for purposes of immediate appeal. The denial 
effectively prevents the requested relief which is based on a 
substantial constitutional right guaranteed under the United States 
Constitution. 
Here, the order is clearly a complete and final rejection of 
the double jeopardy claim. It is of no moment to say that the 
issue may be raised after the fact of a continued process and 
hearing for the imposition of sanctions clearly designed for 
retribution and deterrence. 
Each of the denials before the administrative tribunals was a 
final order for purposes of review. See McNair v. Hayward, 666 
P2d. 321 (Utah - 1983), "...for the obvious reason that an 
application of the normal rule of finality under which the losing 
party must wait... would force the defendant to suffer the 
6 
prejudice the double jeopardy clause seeks to prevent before he 
would have an appellate forum to hear his claim." 
POINT II 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW HAVE DEPARTED FROM THE 
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
The State's policy should evince a sensitivity to the 
possibility of irreparable harm to a professional's reputation 
resulting from an unfounded accusation enhanced by the more relaxed 
nature of the procedures and evidentiary rules followed in 
disciplinary proceedings. 
Professional reputation once lost is not easily restored. 
Johnson Newspaper Corporation v. Melino, 564 NE 2d. 1046, (NY -
1990). 
As stated by the Illinois court: 
It has been repeatedly held in this state that the 
revocation of the license of a professional man carries 
with it dire consequences. It not only involves 
necessarily disgrace and humiliation but it means the end 
of his professional career. In a proceeding so serious, 
due process of law requires a definite charge adequate 
notice and a full fair and impartial hearing. 
Smith v. Department of Registration, 106 NE 2d. 722 (111. -
1952) at p. 728. 
Herein, the record shows that the agency is not concerned 
about the petitioner's experiences with the criminal process, that 
the burden of proof will be entirely different in an administrative 
action, that hearsay evidence will be the order of the day, and 
that the subject of their proceeding may be freely vilified in an 
open public hearing. 
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Moreover, procedures of the agency admittedly ape those of a 
criminal proceeding. The supervisory power of this court should 
clearly be exercised in these matters. 
DATED this J-3 day of A-prtI • , 1992. 
/ 
/ 
DAIffi E. STRATFORD 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 7lL day of r)/V \ , 1992, 
a true and correct copy<T of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI was deposited in the United States Mail, postage 
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State Attorney General 
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A P P E N D I X 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
MAR 2 3 1992 
Ctefx oi the Court 
Utah CvAin cr A&p&m 
Carl W. Barney, 
Petitioner, 
Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, 
Department of Commerce, State 
of Utah, 
Respondent, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 910755-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 2 6 , 1992) 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Dale E. Stratford, Ogden, for Petitioner 
R. Paul Van Dam and Melissa M. Hubbell, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent , 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Orme (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on respondent Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing's motion for summary 
dismissal of the petition for judicial review. We dismiss the 
petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
Petitioner is licensed by the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing to administer a health facility pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-15-1 to -11 (1990). The Division is 
empowered to suspend, revoke or place on probation the license of 
any licensee who "is or has been guilty of unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule." Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-
15 (Supp. 1991). On May 2, 1991, the Division filed its initial 
petition alleging that the petitioner engaged in unprofessional 
conduct including physically abusing four patients and 
administering contaminated medicines, both in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-15-2(a), and administering medication without a 
physician's order, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-10(1) (a) 
(Supp. 1991). On July 22, 1991, the Division filed an amended 
petition alleging basically the same conduct. 
On May 14, 1991, petitioner was found by the Second Circuit 
Court to be not guilty of assault of one of the four patients. 
On May 7, 1991, charges of "Abuse of a Disabled Adult" were 
dismissed. In two separate motions, petitioner moved to dismiss 
the Divisions petitions on grounds that the proceeding 
constituted double jeopardy under the federal and state 
constitutions, and on a claim that the Division did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction under the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. An administrative law judge denied the initial 
motion to dismiss on August 2, 1991, and denied the motion to 
dismiss the amended petition on October 30, 1991. On November 
21, 1991, the petitioner filed a petition for agency review, 
requesting a review of the denial of the motion to dismiss. On 
December 18, 1991, the agency issued an order denying 
petitioner's request for agency review of the denial of the 
motion to dismiss, based upon Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-12(1) (a) 
(Supp. 1991), which permits agency review of "final" orders 
issued at the close of an adjudicative proceeding. Petitioner 
filed the present petition for judicial review, requesting this 
court to review the denial of his motions to dismiss and request 
for agency review. 
The Division contends that this court does not have 
jurisdiction to consider the petition for review because it is 
taken from an interlocutory order of an administrative agency. 
We agree and dismiss the petition. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
"the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) 
(Supp. 1991). This statute does not authorize the court to 
review the orders of every administrative agency, but allows 
judicial review of agency decisions "when the legislature 
expressly authorizes a right of review." DeBrv v. Salt Lake 
County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah App. 1988). 
Proceedings in the Division are governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-8.5(1) 
(Supp. 1991). Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1989) grants this 
court jurisdiction to review final agency actions resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings. 
In Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1989) 
(per curiam), the court concluded that "an order of [an] agency 
is not final so long as it reserves something for the agency for 
further decision." Id. at 464. In Sloan, the court held that an 
order remanding a case to the administrative law judge for 
further proceedings was not a final order for purposes of 
judicial review. Ld. Petitioner contends that the order he 
seeks to have this court review is final because he has 
petitioned to have the order reviewed by the agency following 
denial of his motion to dismiss. He relies upon Heinecke v. 
Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991), for the 
proposition that because departmental review of the 
administrative law judge's order is optional under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-1-12, the refusal of the agency to review the administrative 
law judge's ruling allows judicial review of the administrative 
law judge's order. The argument does not have merit. Petitioner 
confuses the requirement for exhaustion of administrative 
remedies with the requirement for finality. The order in 
Heinecke revoking petitioner's license was clearly final because 
it reflected the determination on all issues before the agency, 
and the issue before this court was whether all levels of agency 
review were complete at the time judicial review was sought. In 
contrast, as noted in Sloan, the requirement of finality 
contemplates that the agency proceedings have been brought to 
their conclusion by disposition of all issues before the agency. 
The denial of a motion to dismiss allows the proceeding to 
continue in the agency and is not a final order for purposes of 
judicial review. 
Petitioner also urges this court to defer a ruling on the 
jurisdictional issue until consideration of the merits of the 
appeal. Under the circumstances of this case, deferral is 
inappropriate. It is a court's first duty to determine if it has 
jurisdiction. Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 
(Utah App. 1989). If the court concludes that it does not have 
jurisdiction, "it retains only the authority to dismiss the 
action." Id. 
We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The 
dismissal is not a determination on the merits and is without 
prejudice to a petition brought at the culmination of the agency 
proceedings. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Russell VL Bench, Judge 
Gregory^; Orme, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of April, 1992, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
Dale E. Stratford 
Attorney at Law 
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State Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Carl W. Barney, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Department of Commerce, 
Division of Licensing, 
Respondent. 
APR 61992 
Mary1 ^txwan 
O * * QUft 
ORDER 
Case No. 910755-CA 
This matter is before the court upon petitioner's Motion 
for Stay of Remittitur, filed April 2, 1992. Respondent's 
opposition to the motion was filed April 3, 1992. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner's 
motion is denied. 
Dated this 
BY THE COURT: 
day of April, 1992. 
Gregory K. "^ Of-me, Judge 
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BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
CARL W. BARNEY TO PRACTICE AS 
A HEALTH FACILITY ADMINISTRATOR 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW 
CASE NO. OPL-91-80 
INTRODUCTION 
This case began with a filing of a Notice of Agency Action and 
Petition by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
(the "Division") on May 3, 1991, seeking sanctions against the 
license of Carl W. Barney ("Respondent") . Since that date there 
has been a steady stream of pleadings: response and answer to the 
petition; motion to dismiss or stay; motion for discovery 
conference; motion to continue hearing date; replies to responses; 
requests for hearing on various motions; many amended versions cf 
the foregoing; and various orders in response theretq. 
On October 30, 1991, the Administrative Law Judge denied 
Respondent's motion to dismiss this proceeding. Respondent's 
request for agency review followed, en November 21, 1991. Oral 
argument in connection with the request for review was denied. 
TT^ -^^ >~-,r-,<-i—n'r TA,\~ ^  •rc.'prp^ pri^ g,i a^ * all times b^ " counsel 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OP. REQUIRING REVISv 
63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure for 
Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce. 
THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
Whether the order denying dismissal of the Amended Notice of 
Agency Action is a "final" order and therefore reviewable by the 
executive director. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The facts at this point are not in dispute; it is the 
legal effect to be given to the denial of the motion to dismiss 
that is at issue for purposes of this review. 
CQMCLT3SIQMS OF IAW 
1. Respondent has the right of agency review only if granted 
by statute cr rule. 
2. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-
~2. szazes zhaz a cart"." mav file a request for review if a statute 
cr the aaencv's rules permit parties to seek review of an order. 
a. The statute permitting agency review'is \3tah Code 
Ann. Section 13-1-12; it permits review of orders issued "at 
zhe close of an adjudicative proceeding" . This does not 
authorize review of interlocutory orders. See Eliason^v^ 
Buhler. et al. , (Order of the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 
900518-CA, December 5, 19 90.) 
b, The rule permitting review/ Rule 251-46b-22, does 
A i ^ u . . a 
the agency. 
3, The denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory 
order where, as here, the order denying the motion to dismiss is 
not a "final" order of the Division and does not dispose of all of 
the issues raised in this proceeding. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED THAT: 
Respondent's Request for Agency Review is denied. 
Dated this ' ft day of December, 1991. 
David Lo Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial reviev; of this Order may be sought: by filing a 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE 
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TO PRACTI 
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FOR ORAL 
CASE NO. 
REQUEST 
ARGUMENT 
OPL-91-69 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 30, 19?L, the Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department entered an order denying Respondent Carl Barney's motion 
for dismissal. On November 25, 1991, the Department received 
Respondent's Fetition for Agency Review of that order. The 
pleadings in this case are voluminous and the Petition for Agency 
Review is of sufficient clarity that it adequately addresses the 
relevant: issues m this appeal. For chat reason, and also to avoid 
further delay in this matter the following order hereby issues: 
ORDER 
The request for oral argument in connection with Respondent's 
Petition for Agency Review is hereby denied. 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
CARL W. BARNEY 
TO PRACTICE AS A 
ADMINISTRATOR IN 
THE LICENSE OF : 
HEALTH FACILITY ! 
THE STATE OF UTAH ! 
ORDER ON 
MOTION 
: CASE NO. 
RESPONDENT'S 
TO DISMISS 
OPL-91-69 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
On August 22, 1991, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the 
July 23, 1991 Amended Notice of Agency Action in this proceeding. On 
September 3, 1991, the Court requested Respondent to file a 
memorandum as to the just-stated motion, inasmuch as certain matters 
set forth in that motion had been previously addressed in this 
Court's August 2, 1991 Order. On September 3, 1991, the Division 
filed a response to Respondent's pending motion. 
Respondent's memorandum in support of the just-stated motion 
was subsequently filed on September 12, 1991. On September 20, 1991, 
the Division filed a supplemental response to the pending motion. 
Respondent's final reply was filed September 27, 1991. 
The Court notes that the Division has filed a September 3, 
1991 motion for summary dismissal of Respondent's motion. On 
September 20, 1991, Respondent filed a response in that regard. Both 
of the just-stated submissions address, in part, the issue raised in 
Respondent's pending motion. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent contends the amended notice of agency action should 
be dismissed as violative of "the Double Jeopardy clauses of the 
Federal and State Constitutions". Respondent initially urges that 
the Division considers the just-referenced pleading to represent "a 
charging document comparable to a complaint in a criminal matter". 
Respondent further contends he has already been tried for the alleged 
conduct in question, found not guilty and double jeopardy "bars a 
subsequent prosecution" in this forum because any finding that 
Respondent engaged in unprofessional conduct necessarily requires 
that the Division will attempt to "prove conduct that constitutes an 
offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted". 
Respondent also renews his prior argument that the Division lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding. 
Before addressing the singular issue now properly presented, 
the Court necessarily reiterates that a professional licensure 
disciplinary proceeding is a unique, statutory proceeding which is 
neither criminal nor quasi-criminal in nature. Rogers v. Division of 
Real Estate, Utah, 790 P.2d 102, 105-06 (1990). See also Ballard v. 
State Motor Vehicle Division, Utah 595 P.2d 781 (1978); Ward v. 
Smith. Utah, 573 P.2d 781 (1978); Johns v. Shulsen. Utah, 717 P.2d 
1336 (1986); Walker v. Board of Pardons, Utah, 803 P.2d 1241 (1990). 
When the Division initiates an adjudicative proceeding 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 58-1-1 et seq., the petition 
issued in that regard constitutes a notice pleading which identifies 
allegations of unprofessional conduct. No salutary purpose is served 
2 
by viewing such a petition as "a charging document comparable to a 
complaint in a criminal matter." Simply put, the prosecutorial aura 
created by such a suggestion tends to distort both the nature of this 
proceeding and, particularly, the basis for entry of any subsequent 
disciplinary sanction. Despite Respondent's somewhat belabored 
philosophical argument, it is neither the purpose nor intended result 
of this proceeding to exact retribution for his alleged misconduct 
and this proceeding is simply not a "criminal prosecution" in any 
sense of that phrase. 
The Court readily concludes that the case of In re McCune, 
Utah, 717 P.2d 701 (1986) is persuasive as to the issue now under 
review. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that 
double jeopardy principles have any application in a Utah State Bar 
disciplinary proceeding, the purpose of which "is to maintain the 
honesty, integrity and professionalism of the Bar". Id at 707. By 
clear and compelling analogy, double jeopardy principles should also 
not apply in disciplinary licensure proceedings, the purpose of which 
is "to protect . . . citizens from harmful and injurious acts by 
persons offering or providing essential or necessary goods and 
services to the general public". See Section 13-1-1. 
One further issue remains to be addressed. On June 20, 1991, 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss this proceeding for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. That motion was denied, as reflected in 
this Court's August 2, 1991 Order. Respondent presents no compelling 
or persuasive arguments that the just-stated ruling should be 
reconsidered and vacated. The Court further concludes that no basis 
3 
exists to modify that order in any other respect. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's August 22, 1991 
motion is denied. 
Dated this 30^^" day of October, 199: 
Eklund 
fministrative Law Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARNEY, CARL, 
Defendant. 
* DAVID E. ROTH, Judge 
Case No. 901900662 
Date: 4-25-91 
James Jones, Reporter 
Fo Lund, Court Clerk 
This is the time set for motion to dismiss 
Mark Decaria, Esq., appearing as counsel for the 
State. 
Defendant was not present nor was counsel. (They did 
not need to be present.) 
Upon State's motion the above case is dismissed. 
Misdemeanors in the Circuit Court where also 
dismissed. 
Court finds where there was no trial there is no 
jeopardy is attached. 
SECOND JUDICIAL, „£> JL.KJLV-.L ' ^ U U A A \^J 
OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
W. BARNEY 
Defendant. 
- 38/11/15 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Circuit No. 90-0570F 
District No. 901900662 
i of Utah 
:y of Weber ss. 
Count I 
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the 
.ainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant XHKXJBOabtXJibetwe )lst day of August , 1989 /in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 1
 'and August 31, 1989 
5 B. MISDEMEANOR, TO-WIT: 
S OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS, 62A-12-223 U.C.A. (1953), 
4ENDED, AS FOLLOWS: 
DEFENDANT HAVING CARE OF A MENTALLY ILL PERSON WHO UNDULY 
*AINS THAT PERSON, EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT AUTHORITY, OR WHO 
TS THAT PERSON WITH WANTON SEVERITY OR CRUELTY, OR IN ANY 
ABUSES THAT PERSON. 
information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
OBBINS 
RELLO 
OOPER 
orized for presentment 
filing: 
) M. RICHARDS, 
ity Attorney 
M^hvu / 
Jeputy) MARK'K 
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o 
b e f o r e me t h i s 
23rd day of January , 1 9 9 1 . 
n o t a r y p u f c i i c / - /i 0 
&Pi VQS mis* May 3 'on 
TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
s. 
\RL W. BARNEY 
Defendant. 
DB — 57/11/15 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Circuit No. 90-0571F 
District No. 901900662 
;ate of Utah 
5unty of Weber ss. 
Count II 
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the 
unplamant has reason to believe that the above named defendant joaxnmjatooii&bt 
le 01st day of August , 1989 / in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
ASS B MISDEMEANOR, TO-WIT: a n d August 31,1989 
KJSE OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS, 62A-12-223 U.C.A. (1953), 
I AMENDED, AS FOLLOWS: 
JD DEFENDANT HAVING CARE OF A MENTALLY ILL PERSON WHO UNDULY 
ISTRAINS THAT PERSON, EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT AUTHORITY, OR WHO 
1EATS THAT PERSON WITH WANTON SEVERITY OR CRUELTY, OR IN ANY 
.Y ABUSES THAT PERSON. 
V 
iKK K. DEC'AKM, DWCA, Complain. MAR
DPS inant 
is information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
ROBBINS 
TRELLO 
COOPER 
thorized for presentment 
3 filing: 
ED, M. RICHARDS, 
anty Attorney 
(Deputy) MARK'H. DECAR1A 
/V-
Subscribed and sworn to 
before me this 
23rd day of January , 1991. 
Notary Publican 
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SECOND JUUiciftL. . .oxi^ j.^ -* 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
1. BARNEY 
Defendant. 
- 58/11/15 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Circuit No. 90-0572F 
District No. 901900662 
of Utah 
y of Weber ss. 
Count III 
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the 
ainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant ^j&XJ&'XJ&SSiffltbetwe 
1st day of August , 1989 /in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
and September 30, 1989 
1 B MISDEMEANOR, TO-WIT: 
: OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS, 62A-12-223 U.C.A. (1953), 
IENDED, AS FOLLOWS: 
DEFENDANT HAVING CARE OF A MENTALLY ILL PERSON WHO UNDULY 
IAINS THAT PERSON. EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT AUTHORITY, OR WHO 
PS THAT PERSON WITH WANTON SEVERITY OR CRUELTY, OR IN ANY WAY 
SS THAT PERSON. 
L 
MARK 
DPS 
I R. DECAK1A, DWCA, Complai / mant 
information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
.OBBINS 
'RELLO 
ALBERT 
iorized for presentment 
filing: 
3 M. RICHARDS, 
rty Attorney 
deputy) MARK R.IDKCARIA 
:77v 
Subscribed and sworn to 
before me this 
23rd day of January , 1991. 
Notary Putmc J^ ~jT/ 
NOTARY PUDUC 
KIMBERLEY A. STYCE 
2549 Wasn Blvd. 7 l r , H 
OcC3n. UL,i c . j 
D p «cs Muy 'Jl 1 ' J 
i T A T c C - U» . . . l 
3/31/89 *** NOTE THE $100.00 IS COURT COSTS *** VPH 
VPH 
REV RFINE on 9/ 1/89 was cancelled VPH 
2/21/90 REV on 2/22/90 was cancelled VPH 
ATTORNEY DALE E. STRATFORD FILES A STIPULATION AND ORDER SETTING VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
ASIDE THE DIVERSION AGREEMENT. COURT SETS ASIDE THE AGREEMENT 
AND ORDERS THE CASE SET FOR TRIAL 
ATTORNEY DALE E. STRATFORD FILES A WRITTEN REQUEST FOR A JURY 
TRIAL 
/23/90 PER VERBAL REQUEST THE COURT ORDERS THE A SPECIAL SETTING FOR 
A TWO DAY JURY TRIAL 
TRL JURY scheduled for 5/10/90 at 
TRJ scheduled for 5/11/90 at 
LETTERS OF TRIAL SENT TO: 
RICHARD L. STINE 
STEVE FARR 
DALE E. STRATFORD 
SOUTH OGDEN CITY (KAREN, COURT CLERK) 
:30 
:30 
A 
A 
in room 
in room 
with III 
with III 
VPH 
COPY OF ENTIRE CASE SENT TO STEVE FARR VPH 
VPH 
'19/90 JUDGE HEFFERNAN SENT A NOTE REQUESTING A PRE-TRIAL CONF. VPH 
ATTORNEY FOR THE CASE K. SULLIVAN FOR S. FARR AND DALE STRATFORD VPH WAS NOTIFIED BY PHONE, BOTH PARTIES AGREED THAT EITHER 5/4/90 
OR 5/7/90 AT 1:30 WOULD BE A GOOD TIME FOR THEM. 
JUDGE HEFFERNAN WAS NOTIFIED OF THE DATES. THE COURT ORDERED 
TO SET CASE FOR 5/7/90 
'20/90 HRG scheduled for 5/ 7/90 at 1:30 P in room with III 
'07/90 
III 169 DIGIT 474 BEFORE PGH. ATP PRESENT ATD PRESENT. BOTH 
PARTIES WAVE A JURY TRIAL. PRE CONFERENCE MEETING IS HELD. 
14/90 III 172 DIGIT 266 THROUGH III 179 DIGIT 580 BEFORE PGH. DEF 
PRESENT WITH COUNSEL. TRIAL HELD. COURT FINDS DEF NOT GUILTY. 
Entered case disposition of: CLOSED 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
VPH 
PLH 
PLH 
PLH 
PLH 
PLH 
PLH 
PLH 
PLH 
ounting Summary 
aid in full 
Total Due 
100.00 
Paid 
100.00 
Credit Balance Time Pay# 
itional Case Data 
Case Disposition 
Disposition....: CLOSED DATE: 05/14/90 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 11/15/38 
Dr. Lie. No.: State:.UT Expires: 
•^'•HSOFUTAH 
COUNTY OF v'/E5ER * " 
D O C K E T 
ND CIRCUIT COURT- OGDEN 
PRCUIT COURT.zUH 
BY W W ^ 
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THURSDAY MAY 24, 1990 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF THE CITY OF SOUTH OGDEN 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF SOUTH OGDEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL BARNEY 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
No. 
The undersigned complainant has reason to believe and states upon oath that the 
above-named defendant, in the City of South Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, on 
the y & day of A p r i l , 19 88 , committed the offense of 
A s s a u l t and B a t t e r y , to-wit: 
By then and there committing an assault and 
battery against or on the person of Peggy 
O'Niel, the complainant. 
(5865 Wasatch Drive) 
contrary to the provisions of S e c t i o n 15-5 of t h e Code 
Approved: 
of said city. 
City Attorney Complainant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 19 88 
City Justice of the Peace 
City of South Ogden 
